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It is reasonable that the strict sciences represented by
mathematics, physics and chemistry have nearly been
a kind of substitutional belief of humans after“the
Death of God”. To conclude theoretically, the sig-
nificant attraction or the extremely great power of
science is, in a word, the validity of thinking and ac-
tion. From the viewpoint of human action or prac-
tice, science is the only really effective means we have
to deal with nature (the other) that speaks the lan-
guage of power. Being a creature that maybe has
no competitive advantage in biological sense except
the brain, men could not live in the world without
power, and the subjective human power represented
and embodied in science can be considered as the only
secret by which we could stand above all the other be-
ings on the earth. Cognitively, science is the language
that has the most conciseness and certainty of think-
ing among all the theoretical discourse of human that
aim at seeking the truth. Any theoretical disputation
or problem in scientific fields will be solved ultimately.
In the face of the methodology program composed of
rational logic (mathematical calculation) and experi-
mental demonstration (experiment), the true or false
of competitive scientific presentations will be judged
immediately and unimpeachably. Contrarily, in the
research fields of the humanities, the fact that there
are various opinions on the very matter and no one
could say the last word about which is right is an ob-
vious and common theoretical phenomenon in the lib-
eral arts represented by literature, history and philos-
ophy. As said by A. N. Whitehead, a modern Amer-
ican philosopher, all Western philosophies are just
endless reinterpretations of the original philosophy
questions asked by Plato. Cognition inconsistency is
only a transitory exception during certain developing
stages to sciences, but it becomes a regular rule to
the humanities. According to the Paradigm theory of
Thomas Kuhn, a contemporary scientific philosopher
who suggested this theory after studying the process
of the history of sciences, this phenomenon means
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that compared with sciences, the humanities are still
at the “pre-science” stage that no uniform thinking
paradigm has been established. The problem that
a consensus is hard to reach is the greatest challenge
that the humanities face in cognition besides the com-
mon query on the validity and practicability of the
humanities. The observation on the theoretical dif-
ference in cognition consistency between the sciences
and humanities is the starting point of all the follow-
ing analyses.
It is easy to see that, the direct reason why a
consensus is hard to reach in the humanities is be-
cause people could not put related questions into cal-
culation, as what they do in sciences, for example
by mathematical formulas or experiments, when in-
volved in theory disputation. In other words, there
is no such authoritative common methodology pro-
gram in the humanities as in sciences. Experiment is
the soul of scientific methods, and the lack of uniform
methods in the humanities ultimately results from the
lack of the process of experimental demonstration. In
philosophy, the cognition consistency belongs to the
category of intersubjectivity, and the achievement of
intersubjectivity finally relies on subject-object rela-
tionship. The lack of the process of practice (experi-
ment), which is the means of realizing the subjectivity
to the objectivity, results in the extreme difficulties
in judging the right or wrong of theories. Here what
needs to be necessarily pointed out is that, academ-
ically speaking, the theoretical proposition “Practice
is the sole criterion for judging truth”, which is well-
known in the intelligentsia of China, is the result of in-
appropriate words translation of the scientific propo-
sition “Experiments verify theories and hypotheses”.
As many people nowadays have realized, the political
significance of this proposition is much higher than
its academic meaning. Macroscopically, although the
general interrelation of a certain social reality and a
special social concept or policy, as well as the ad-
vantages and disadvantages of different concepts and
policies in long term may be judged, we usually are
hard to determine the cognition of the concrete ef-
fects and mutual causalities of all factors that lead to
the total result, thus there is no strict uniform an-
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swer on the question that what concrete theoretical
conclusions could be drawn from macroscopical social
practice results. For example, western strategy an-
alyzers had early predicted the final collapse of the
Soviet Union before its disintegration based on politi-
cal and economic theories, and the development of the
situation in 1989 also seemed to prove the correctness
of this prediction. However, just as the column ar-
ticle Shorting Through the Runes—How pundits and
scholars are interpreting the European Revolution that
none of them predicted (Times, 23 April 1990) indi-
cates, analyzers still could not reach a consensus on
the actual factors and causalities resulting in the col-
lapse of the regime. On the contrary, if there were
indeed a means of experimental demonstration in the
humanities as in sciences, then the difference in cogni-
tion consistency between the sciences and humanities
would be unimaginable.
The difficulties in applying practical means to
judge theories and reach consensuses in the field of
the humanities relate to various complex factors, in-
cluding the special moral restrictions on social exper-
iments, the non-experiential direct features of social
and historical phenomena that are unlike that of na-
ture, and the heterogeneity of humanistic reality that
is different from natural entities and makes quan-
titative studies hard to be carried out, and so on.
What is more important, humanistic studies usually
are involved with value conflicts, while the basic hu-
man value orientations such as the incomplete com-
patibility between freedom and equality usually make
the matter that is undiachronic from certain view-
point hard to get a uniform answer. For instance,
the American government used to stipulate that col-
leges and universities should have a certain enrollment
proportion of black students in order to avoid racial
discrimination. However, some white students whose
test marks were better than black ones were denied
by the school as a result of this regulation, and this
even caused a lawsuit between white students and the
school authorities in the Medical College of University
of California (Affirmative Action; ref. 1 ). The law-
suit reason of white students was also to fight against
the inequality due to complexion, and they demanded
the right to be enrolled according to the mark. In
this case, there does exist the possibility of verifying
the regulation by practice, but in front of the allow-
able discrepancy of people’s interests, the verification
result would be of no help to the outcome of a con-
sensus that could be accepted by both sides. The
reason is that, from the viewpoint of the efficiency of
education investment, practice can display the differ-
ent effects that students contribute to the society be-
tween high-marked ones and low-marked ones, while
from the viewpoint of avoiding racial discrimination,
certain related policies are also necessary to be imple-
mented whereas this may result in a new inequality to
the white. Anyhow, we may easily draw a concise and
clear conclusion from any point of view, but the ques-
tion is that we could hardly find a uniform resolution
that satisfies both sides; therefore what is practical is
only the compromise in politics. In conclusion, it is
an unavoidable fact that there is much difference in
cognition consistency and thereby the clearness and
certainty of the theory between the sciences and hu-
manities because of different possibilities of the means
of experimental demonstration in cognition methods.
Facts speak for themselves. However, what kinds
of thought conclusions can be drawn from facts de-
pend on fine and concrete analyses.
In the eyes of scientific monists, the fact that
there is noticeable difference in cognition consistency
between the sciences and humanities clearly demon-
strates the weak and immature academic state of the
humanities compared with strict sciences. To the
hawks of these monists, this fact can be the adequate
reason to sentence the humanities to death in aca-
demic sense. To the doves of them, this at least means
that sciences are the only academic model, and the
humanities should improve themselves with sciences
as their example. It seems needless to tell the advan-
tage and disadvantage of the sciences and humanities
in cognition and their respective academic future ac-
cording to the present discussion. However, the con-
clusion may not be so if we make detailed analysis on
the actual meaning and necessity of the achievement
of cognition consistency in sciences.
Thanks to Wittgenstein’s supposition on “lan-
guage game”, we can see that the experimental
demonstration program, which is the settling mech-
anism of cognition differences in sciences, hides a the-
oretical prerequisite, namely reference exclusivity, by
which game rule sciences finally attain the unique cri-
terion of judging the validity of cognition. For exam-
ple, the demonstrating means of sciences is like the
goal of football, and the judgment of win or lose can
be made only by the score on the basis of this expe-
riential and practicable means. On the contrary, the
situation of the humanities seems like that there is no
goal in a football match, and the win or lose (score)
is replaced by which team plays “better”, which is an
ambiguous concept. Therefore, disagreements are un-
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avoidable because features like technique, pass, pos-
session, or sport morality can all be used validly but
differently by referees, coaches or fans as the crite-
rion of judgment under the background of the lack of
uniform criterion.
The setting of the goal and the rule of judging
the match by the score ensure the authority of the
match result, however, the question now is that, are
such game rules really reasonable and unimpeachable?
This is because the features like possession and tech-
nique besides score are indeed essential judging ele-
ments in football, while the score sometimes can not
totally reflect the actual situation of the match, es-
pecially in cases such as the weak team goals in one
shoot and wins while the strong team shoots many
times but could not goal, and also the judgment by
penalty kicks after 120 minutes’ draw. In fact, the
reason why the score becomes the criterion of judg-
ment is largely because of its game’s rule instead of
rationality.
One of the important characteristics of the judg-
ment of problems by a unique practicable criterion
is that, the right and wrong are entirely different,
namely “Winner takes all”. The rationality of such
logic clearly should be doubted. Utility is the most
fundamental game rule in sciences, and according to
the theory of pragmatism, in experiential world the
possible utility of the truth of cognition is its actual
“cash value”, and whether the cognition is true or
not depends on whether it is effective in practice. We
agree to some extent that there are relative differences
between the exploration of truth in scientific theory
and the application in technology, but fundamentally
speaking, what sciences pursue is the concrete “Know-
ing” to the object instead of the close and sympa-
thetically “Understanding” that the humanities try
to do. What sciences finally give to us is the control-
ling power to the object, which is the internal rea-
son of the strengthening integration of science and
technology in modern society. Actually speaking, the
so-called “true” is simply equals to “effective” under
such game rules.
One of the common characteristics of the human-
ities is their separation with concrete practice. Theo-
ries of history or philosophy could neither be put into
experiments one by one nor be converted into tech-
nical means that have direct effects on reality. To
some extent, humanities are really trying to master
the complete truth about the world and the existence
on the whole. Under the background of the lack of
experiential orientation and verifying program, only
complete and resolute truth can be considered as real
truth. Hence the acquirement of humanistic truth can
only be approached endlessly and historically in a cir-
cle of hermeneutics of the part and the whole, and
the current absence of cognition consistency is thus
the theoretical cost of such exploration of truth.
The fable that the blind men try to size up the
elephant is suitable for describing the different situa-
tions in cognition between the sciences and humani-
ties. The words of the blind men considering the ele-
phant by what they have touched can be compared
with the research of the humanities considering the
truth by what they have explored, and the status that
all the persons are blind can be regarded as the ab-
sence of complete truth (the whole elephant). Here
what should be specially noticed is that, we should
not simply regard the blindness in the fable only as a
visual defect, but should regard it as a certain symbol
of human cognition. We do not have the God’s eye
that could see everything clearly in the exploration
of the truth of world; as a result we can only touch
this or that part of the elephant in the darkness. The
different words of the blind men about the elephant
are ludicrous from direct seeing, but we are in the
same situation as the blind men of the fable in the
face of the world in cognitive sense. To emphasize,
although neither of the blind men can realize the true
face of the whole elephant, their different words about
the elephant are not groundless but each has its basis
and is right from its point of view.
In the field of sciences, what the “elephant” is like
is decided by its actual utility, which means that the
thing touched is the thing what it can be used as. For
instance, if a fellow is leading a horse and wants to tie
it, then he may take the leg of elephant for a hitch-
ing post, and seemingly the person who hides from
wind behind the elephant may take its huge body for
a wall, and so on. Anyhow, in the point of view of
the complete truth, experimental science is also blind
like the humanities. The difference is that the for-
mer replaces the whole blindness with partial clarity
while the latter undertakes the exploration for com-
plete truth under the background of the absence of
partial clarity because of their different possibilities
in experimental demonstration.
As the saying goes, seeking truth from facts, and
the so-called “truth” usually come out as one “unique
truth”, whereas the puzzlement of the humanities in
cognition consistency is that it is unable to decide
which is the unique truth. This fact is indeed dis-
appointing, however, to further investigate, the en-
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thusiasm of human to seek the unique truth in the
end is still directly related to the need of action. Dif-
ferent minds are the cause of failure while undivided
attention is the essential thinking prerequisite to the
success of action. This is the background on which the
cognition consistency attains its theoretical impor-
tance in sciences. On the contrary, the inconsistency
of cognition is not the absolute prerequisite to the
truth of thought in the field of the humanities, which
are aimed at education and cultivation instead of di-
rect practice. Therefore, there is no inevitable logic
relationship between “truth” and “unique truth”, and
it is uncertain for competitive theoretical words that
one of them must be false or all are false as in logic.
Unable to decide which is right is fundamentally dif-
ferent from nothing is right, and the novelty and rich-
ness of theory often have more essential significance
to the thought in the situation that the aim of cogni-
tion is not directly related to a certain action that is
ready to go. Overpressure of consistency on the con-
trary would easily kill the creativity of thought and
the vitality of theory.
In conclusion, there is noticeable difference in cog-
nition consistency between the sciences and human-
ities. Cognition consistency has significant meaning
to sciences that ultimately aims at practice and util-
ity, whereas it is not so to the educational subjects of
study (in the German term, Bildung) like philosophy,
history that are not practice-oriented and whose sta-
tus of serious learning can not be disturbed by the lack
of cognition consistency. Although in different forms,
the sciences and humanities are both indispensable
academic languages of human and have no difference
in superiority. In Gadamer’s words, the humanities
meet “the claim to truth outside science” and “can be
philosophically legitimated”(2 ), and this is our con-
clusion.
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